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THE SPACE AGE: LEGAL AND POLICY PROBLEMS
Carl T. Curtis*
P UBLIC realization that the Space Age was at hand came with the
launching of Sputnik on October 4, 1957. A second and much
larger Soviet earth satellite, containing a dog, was launched on Novem-
ber 3, 1957. This startling emergence of Soviet space science and tech-
nology had grave implications for the security of the free world, be-
cause it demonstrated that the U.S.S.R. possessed much of the tech-
nology required to explore and control space. Moreover, through the
Sputnik launchings, the Soviet Union revealed a capacity to launch in-
tercontinental ballistic missiles. Future methods of maintaining peace or
waging war would be greatly altered by man's newly found ability to
make use of space.
Repercussions from these significant events were felt immediately
throughout the free world. In the United States Senate, the Prepared-
ness Investigating Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee
moved swiftly to start hearings in November 1957. The Subcommittee's
"Inquiry Into Satellite and Missile Programs" continued through the
rest of that year during which it heard testimony from leaders in Gov-
ernment, science, education, and industry concerning existing and future
national defense. By January 1958 the Subcommittee had concluded that
although the satellite was not yet a weapon, the Soviet Union by leading
the world into outer space had made it necessary for the United States
to put forth a tremendous effort to insure its own preeminence in de-
fense and space. Recognizing that its jurisdictional responsibilities were
limited to defense, the Subcommittee pointed out the necessity for others
to explore whatever needed to be done to involve the total effort of the
Nation. The Subcommittee agreed that "... . the same forces, the same
knowledge and the same technology which are producing ballistic mis-
siles can also produce instruments of peace and universal cooperation." 1
* United States Senator from Nebraska; Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Com-
mittee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences; Nebraska Wesleyan University.
'Hearings on Inquiry into Satellite and Missile Programs before a Subcomm. on
Preparedness Investigating of the Senate Armed Services Comm., 85th Cong., 1st & 2d
Sess., pt. 3, at 2429 (1958).
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I. ORGANIZATION OF SPACE ACTIVITIES
Thus arose the first policy question of the Space Age: how to organize
and administer our activities on earth so that we could carry on an ef-
fective space program. Little more than thirteen years have passed since
that dramatic event in October 1957. Looking back to the period of
inception, it is unlikely that anyone could have then foreseen the com-
plexity and scope of legal and policy problems which would emerge with
man's venture into the new environment of outer space.
A. The United States-The Formation of NASA
The initial problems requiring solution were those in the field of gov-
ernment organization. Immediate needs included the establishment of
legislative jurisdiction, policies governing all aspects of space explora-
tion, executive-legislative relations, civilian-military coordination, and
the organization and administration of international activities.
In the hearings held before the Senate Preparedness Investigating Sub-
committee it became evident that the comprehensive nature of space ac-
tivities cut across the jurisdictional lines of several standing committees
of the House and Senate. Moreover, a different group of the substantive
committee could be involved with each differing piece of space explora-
tion legislation, including the necessary processes of the Committees on
Appropriations.
As an interim measure, the Senate established a Special Committee on
Space and Astronautics on February 6, 1958 consisting of fifteen ap-
pointed members most of whom were either chairmen or ranking mem-
bers of the standing committees which had a logical interest in space ex-
ploration: Appropriations, Foreign Relations, Armed Services, Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, Government Operations and the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy.
Evidencing the importance that Congress attached to space explora-
tion was the election of Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson as
Committee Chairman and the former President Pro Tempore of the
Senate, Styles Bridges, as the ranking minority committee member. The
House of Representatives similarly created the Select Committee on As-
tronautics and Space Exploration on March 5, 1958, with thirteen mem-
bers whose permanent committee assignments also largely reflected the
possible extension of their interests to space and space-related subjects.
Significantly, the Chairman was John W. McCormack, the Majority
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Leader, and the Ranking Republican was Joseph W. Martin, Jr., the
Minority Leader.
The establishment of permanent organizations in the Congress for
handling legislative space matters was a task for internal consideration
rather than one whose solution could reasonably be sought through the
process of public hearings. The Senate special committee analyzed the
advantages and disadvantages of four alternative methods of committee
organization and jurisdiction: (1) separate standing committees in the
Senate and House; (2) division of jurisdiction among existing standing
committees; (3) assignment of jurisdiction to the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy; and (4) creation of a Joint Committee on Aeronautics
and Space.
There was a measure of support in the Congress for the creation of
a Joint Committee on Aeronautics and Space in the bill whose provisions
would ultimately be enacted into law. In reporting the legislation to the
House on the creation of the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration, the House Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Explora-
tion recommended a joint congressional committee. However, the idea
was abandoned by the House in favor of amending its rules to provide
for a separate Committee on Science and Astronautics. The Senate ver-
sion of the space legislation provided for a Joint Committee on Aero-
nautics and Space, but when the matter was considered by the confer-
ence committee the Senate acceded to the expressed preference of the
House for separate standing committees.
Most of the major components of our basic United States govern-
mental policy on space activities are set forth in the National Aeronautics
and Space Act of 1958.2 Declaring that the policy of the United States
is that space activities should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the
benefit of all mankind, and that our welfare and security require an ade-
quate program and leadership,3 the law provided for the establishment
of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).4 Build-
ing its organization upon the nucleus of the National Advisory Com-
mittee for Aeronautics (NACA) and acquiring certain 'functions from
the Department of Defense, NASA was given authority to "plan, direct
and conduct aeronautical and space activities" with the exception: of
242 U.S.C. §§ 2451-2476 (1964).
3 Id. at§ 2451. .
4 Id. at § 2472.
5 Id. at §2473. , . '
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those primarily concerned with defense. The Department of Defense
was given responsibility over "activities peculiar to or primarily asso-
ciated with the development of weapons systems, military operations,
or the defense of the United States.. . " 61 Both agencies were provided
authority to engage in research and development in these areas.
The initial draft legislation toward the organization of the United
States aeronautical and space program was introduced in the Senate on
April 4, 1958 as a bill, S. 3609,1 and was referred to a special committee
which held hearings in May of that year. No differences of opinion de-
veloped among committee members over three of the main proposals:
(1) a civilian space agency should be established; (2) the National Ad-
visory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) should be the nucleus of
the new agency; and (3) the Department of Defense should be respon-
sible for space programs essential to national defense.
Implicit in the original draft legislation, however, was a different as-
sumption concerning the nature of the problem to be solved from that
which was in the act as finally passed by the Congress. The assumption
underlying the original version of S. 3609 was that a total U.S. space
program could result from dividing projects among agencies and declar-
ing that they should voluntarily cooperate. However, no provision was
made for overall coordination. There was an impression, it should be
noted, that the Director of the new space agency would have consider-
able authority over the U.S. civilian space program. For example, he
would be given an advisory rather than an executive board within his
own organization, and furthermore he would not have to share authority
and responsibility with others as in a commission-type structure. Never-
theless, it was not clear how the overlap between the new civilian agency
(which eventually became NASA) and the Department of Defense
would be handled. Neither was it apparent how other agencies with
space-related programs would be coordinated; for example, the Atomic
Energy Committee (nuclear rockets), the Department of State (inter-
national agreements), the Department of Commerce (meteorology), and
others.
Since coordination of any large undertaking requires some organiza-
tional arrangement for centralized guidance, the legislation which ulti-
6 Id. at § 2451.
7 S. 3609, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1958).
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mately passed the Senate" contained a provision for a National Aero-
nautics and Space Policy Board over which the President would preside.
During the conference on the different space bills which passed the Sen-
ate and House, the Senate concept that interagency coordination should
be at a high level led to final agreement on the establishment of the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Council. Another contribution of the
Senate to the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 was the estab-
lishment of recognition that a section providing for international coop-
eration was needed. In its declaration of policy and purpose, the original
bill defined one of its objectives as "cooperation by the United States
with other nations and groups of nations in work done pursuant to this
act and in the peaceful application of the results thereof," 1 but there
was no subsequent implementing section in the bill. A section on Inter-
national Cooperation was written into the bill and became part of the
NASA act authorizing the new agency to engage in a program of in-
ternational space cooperation under the foreign policy guidance of the
President. °
In the November 1958 elections, the Democratic party won substan-
tial majorities in the House and Senate. Anxious allies of the United
States considered the possibility of an impasse between the President and
the Congress in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. This was largely
dispelled, however, when Secretary of State Dulles, on behalf of Presi-
dent Dwight D. Eisenhower, extended an invitation to the Senate Ma-
jority Leader, Lyndon B. Johnson, to represent the United States in the
United Nations, which was then considering the establishment of an
ad hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Senator John-
son allayed any fears that partisan politics might affect the participation
of the United States in the space program:
... I am here to express to you the essential unity of the American
people in their support of the goals of the resolution offered now in
their name. This resolution is presented, as our system requires, by the
representative of the executive branch of our Government. I speak
here today at its request.
8 The House bill was passed in lieu of the Senate bill. See generally 2 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMm. NEws 3160 (1958).
9 This language was retained in the legislation that was finally enacted. National
Aeronautics and Space Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2451 (1964).
10 Id. at § 2475.
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The executive position in the United States is held by the Republi-
can Party through the mandate of the people. I am here as a mem-
ber of one house of the legislative branch, in which the majority posi-
tion is held, also at the mandate of the people, by the Democratic Party,
of which I am a member.
These are distinctions. They are not, on this resolution, differences.
On the goal of dedicating outer space to peaceful purposes for the
benefit of all mankind there are no differences within our Govern-
ment, between our parties, or among our people. The executive and
the legislative branches of our Government are together .... 1
Thus, the United States space program, from its earliest days, was cast
in a bipartisan, if not a nonpartisan, mold.
B. The United Nations-Intenational Agreements on Space
Policy objectives of the United Nations for international space activi-
ties began to take shape as part of the comprehensive negotiations on
disarmament. The United States, in January 1957, almost nine months
before an earth satellite was first orbited, indicated its readiness to par-
ticipate in "fair, balanced, reliable systems" for controlling outer space
vehicles in order to devote their use exclusively to peaceful, scientific
purposes. However, in March 1958, the Soviet Union voted against a
resolution proposed to the United Nations that the use of cosmic space
for military purposes be banned, that foreign military bases be elimi-
nated, and that an agency for international cooperation be established
by the United Nations to study space policy. In September 1958, the
United States requested the General Assembly to consider a program for
international cooperation in outer space and to declare itself on "the
separability of the question of the peaceful uses of outer space from that
of disarmament." This policy determination was deemed desirable so
that the lack of agreement on an effective system of inspection and con-
trol of armaments need not delay progress in establishing agreement on
space exploration.
Both President Eisenhower and President Kennedy supported inter-
national control of space activities through the United Nations. On
September 22, 1960, President Eisenhower in an address to the United
Nations, proposed that:
"1 Address by Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, United Nations Political and Security Com-
mittee, Nov. 17, 1958.
[ ol. 6:49
THE SPACE AGE
(1) We agree that celestial bodies are not subject to national ap-
propriation by any claims of sovereignty.
(2) We agree that the nations of the world shall not engage in war-
like activities on these bodies.
(3) We agree, subject to appropriate verification, that no nation will
put into orbit or station in outer space weapons of mass destruction.
All launchings of space craft should be verified in advance by the
United Nations.
(4) We press forward with a program of international cooperation
for constructive peaceful uses of outer space under the United Na-
tions. Better weather forecasting, improved world-wide communica-
dons, and more effective exploration not only of outer space but of
our own earth-these are but a few of the benefits of such coopera-
ion....
Similarly, in his State of the Union message of January 30, 1961, Presi-
dent Kennedy stated:
.. . [T]his Administration intends to explore promptly all possible
areas of cooperation with the Soviet Union and other nations to in-
voke the wonders of science instead of its terrors. Specifically, I now
invite all nations-including the Soviet Union-to join with us in de-
veloping a weather prediction program, in a new communications satel-
lite program, and in preparation for probing the distant planets of Mars
and Venus, probes which may some day unlock the deepest secrets of
the universe. 12
Specific results of the United States' efforts are seen in two space
treaties negotiated in the United Nations: The Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies," (Outer Space
Treaty) which entered into force on October 10, 1967; and The Agree-
ment on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Re-
turn of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 4 (Treaty on the Rescue
of Astronauts) entered into force on December 3, 1968.
The Outer Space Treaty consists of a preamble and seventeen articles.
Some objectives of the Treaty are implicit in its provisions which offer
solutions for anticipated problems: (1) International law and the United
12 107 CONG. REc. 1363 (1961).
13 [1967] 3 US.T. 2410.
14 [1968] 6 U.S.T. 7570.
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Nations Charter govern space activities; (2) Nations are guided by the
principles of cooperation and mutual assistance, avoiding harmful con-
tamination and adverse environmental changes, consulting as necessary
if such problems arise; (3) Nations may be given opportunity by other
States to observe flights of their space objects; (4) Comprehensive infor-
mation on space activities shall be provided so that it may be disseminated
promptly and effectively by the United Nations Secretary General in
the interest of international peaceful space cooperation; (5) Installations
and equipment on the Moon and other celestial bodies are open to repre-
sentatives of other nations on a reciprocal basis, provided interference
with normal operations is avoided. The Treaty provisions are made ap-
plicable to international intergovernmental organizations, and if prob-
lems arise they are to be resolved by treaty member states, by the organi-
zation, or by one or more of its members.
The general guiding principle that astronauts shall be regarded as "en-
voys of mankind," receiving all possible assistance in case of accident,
distress, or emergency landing, including return to the State which regis-
tered the spacecraft is set forth in Article V of the Outer Space Treaty.
The Treaty on the Rescue of Astronauts further develops the duties at-
tendant to this undertaking, making specific arrangements for notifica-
tion of the launching authority and the Secretary General of the United
Nations for search and rescue operations, and for safe and prompt re-
turn. Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty provides that the launch-
ing authority retains ownership of objects sent into outer space, and
should they fall to earth they shall be returned after identifying data has
been supplied. Under Article VII, the launching State is internationally
liable for damage.
II. UNRESOLVED INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS
The two space accords discussed above were significant steps toward
providing guidance in the solution of possible international problems
arising from the use and exploration of the space environment. Never-
theless, two principal subjects relating to international space law have
not yet been resolved. These concern (1) the legal differentiation be-
tween airspace and outer space and (2) international rules and proce-
dures concerning the liability for damages caused by space objects to
ensure prompt and equitable treatment for victims of such damage.
[Vol. 6:49
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A. Defining Outer Space
Implicit in the Treaty on Outer Space is the provision that outer space
and celestial bodies are to be free for exploration by all States. Since air-
space by existing law and custom is subject to national sovereignty, many
international lawyers were concerned that it would be difficult to pre-
vent claims of sovereignty over outer space unless a definite boundary
line between airspace and outer space were determined. Numerous ideas
were advanced 1r but resulted only in the determination that there was
no legal, scientific and technical basis for determining an exact delinea-
tion between airspace and outer space.
The American Bar Foundation made a tabulation of early proposals
for "altitude boundaries" between airspace and outer space to illustrate
differences of opinion.:" Among the proposals suggested were setting
the limit of airspace at fifty-two miles because this was considered the
limit of atmospheric lift; at sixty miles because this was considered the
point at which the earth's gravitational effect disappears; and at two to
three hundred miles as an analogy to the three-mile limit at sea.
It became apparent in considering this problem that some suggested
legal definitions would have made a specific satellite in an elliptical orbit
fall within "sovereign" limits at perigee only to escape from such "sover-
eign" conditions at apogee. In this connection it should be noted that
the United States Explorer 6 had a perigee of 157 miles and an apogee
of 26,366 miles.
The difficulty of delimiting airspace from outer space is complicated
further by the rapid development of technology both in aeronautics and
astronautics. The progress of technology has steadily increased the upper
boundaries at which aircraft can operate. Also, there is currently under
study a new type of spacecraft-the space shuttle-which would have
15 For discussions of proposals for delimiting airspace and outer space, see A. HALEY,
SPACE LAW AND GOVERNMENT 75-135 (1963); C. JiumsS, SPACE LAW 98-101, 106, 111, 122,
134-35, 139, 155, 157, 159 (1965); M. McDouGAL, H. LASSWELL & I. VLAsic, LAW AND
PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 323-59 (1963); Christol, The International Law of Outer Space,
in hTRNATIONAL LAw STuDiEs 1962, at 185, 187-88, 191, 239-53, 261 (1966); L. LiPsoN &
N. KATZENBACH, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, REPORT ON THE NATiONAL AERONAUJTICS AND
SPACE ADMINISTRATION BY TE AmziucAN BAR FOuNDATION 785-805 (1960), in LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF SPACE FXPLORATION, A SYmpOSIuM, S. Doc. No. 26, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
1392 (1961) (hereinafter cited as AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION REPORT]. This symposium
includes a number of papers by individual authors who discuss problems of drawing
a boundary between airspace and outer space. See also Doyle, When a Lid on National
Sovereignty?, in ASTRONAUTICS & AERONAUTICS 94-95 (Oct. 1967).
16 See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION REPORT, note 15 supra.
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maneuverability in airspace similar to existing aircraft while having the
characteristics of a spacecraft for operation in outer space.
It is interesting to note that to date no nation has protested the flight
of space vehicles over its territory. Whether the status quo will continue
as new and advanced technological applications in space are born re-
mains a matter of conjecture. In the meantime the United Nations Com-
mittee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space is continuing its study of the
problem.
B. Liability for Outer Space Activities
Although the Outer Space Treaty contains a provision making any
State party to the Treaty internationally liable for damage to another
State as a result of its outer space activities, it was generally recognized
by the member nations of the Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, and by the General
Assembly that a separate convention on liability would be required to
obtain international agreement.
Throughout the development of the law applicable to activities in
outer space, no one has seriously challenged the need to establish criteria
for determining liability and procedures for assuring compensation in the
event of damage caused by the launching of a space object. Through
the system of domestic law, individual nations are able to establish ap-
propriate rules for compensating their own nationals who are affected
by space accidents. However, the international consequence of outer
space activities becomes more complex because the movement of objects
in outer space is not constrained by national boundaries, and the return
to a designated location cannot always be effected.
As a result of intensive negotiations held within the Legal Subcom-
mittee, most of the substantive issues regarding liability for damages have
been resolved. However, there remain two procedural issues which pre-
vent complete agreement: (1) whether a claimant State which finds that
its negotiations for compensation with the launching State cannot be re-
solved may take the matter to arbitration before an impartial tribunal;
and (2) whether there should be a limitation on the liability of a launch-
ing State for damage resulting from a single accident. The United States
has supported third-party arbitration and has proposed an amount of
$500 million as a reasonable limitation of liability. It is generally believed
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that if agreement can be obtained on these two issues all other topics rela-
tive to liability in outer space will be readily resolved.
III. NEW PROBLEMS FROM SPACE AGE TECHNOLOGY
Rapidly developing space age technology has provided man with the
challenge of developing new modes and institutions to handle accom-
panying problems. A few examples are illustrative of the impact of space
technology upon man's daily activities.
A. Colmmnications
In less than a decade since NASA launched its first application satel-
lite, space age technology has been responsible for significant expansion
and improvement in the area of communications systems. The Com-
munications Satellite Act of 196218 has the expressed purpose of serv-
ing the communications needs of the United States and other coun-
tries, and thereby promoting the causes of world peace and understand-
ing.1" The Act also created the Communications Satellite Corporation
(COMSAT) ,20 a United States commercial system, to carry out the ob-
jectives of the Act.
In August 1964, representatives of the United States Department of
State and COMSAT entered into agreements with governments and tele-
communications officials of ten other nations to organize what eventu-
ally became the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium-
called "Intelsat."
By common agreement among the members of Intelsat, the COMSAT
Corporation manages the international consortium. Intelsat membership
has grown from an original eleven nations to more than seventy.
Since the launch of COMSAT's first communications satellite, Early
Bird, in 1965, communications satellites have made a major impact on
global communications. The satellite has provided a needed supplement
to existing cable, radio and microwave links, and provided their equiva-
lent where they do not exist. At present, communications satellites are
17 For a full discussion on establishing liability in outer space see Statement by Paul G.
Dembling, former General Counsel of the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion, before Colloquium on Space Law, International Institute of Space Law, October,
1970.
1s47 U.S.C. §§ 701-744 (1964).
19 rd. at § 701.
20 Id. at § 731-35.
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largely used for transoceanic traffic, providing economical links across
the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans. Before communications satel-
lites were available, a West Coast-to-Japan cable circuit cost $15,000
per month; COMSAT was able to offer this service at a monthly charge
of $4,000. Reduced costs are stimulating new uses for telecommunica-
tions in such enterprises as banks, stock exchanges, hotel reservations,
cable television, hospitals and computer centers.
A new type of communications satellite, the broadcast satellite, has
recently been developed by NASA. This type of communications satel-
lite system can broadcast from a satellite directly into a home radio or
television receiver. The ordinary home television set can receive such
broadcasts today by merely adding a larger antenna and some additional
electronics. In the future, these additions may be unnecessary.
One of the reasons for the intense interest in the broadcast satellite
system is that it can provide direct television coverage where none now
exists without the necessity of developing a conventional television dis-
tribution system. In the underdeveloped parts of the world, for example,
governments can, by use of the broadcast satellite, provide instruction
to their people in such matters as population control, agriculture, child
care and food preparation.
In September 1969, the United States signed an agreement with India
which will permit the Indian government to use our Applications Tech-
nology Satellite F (ATS-F) in a trial program of this kind. Under this
agreement, NASA will make the ATS-F satellite available to India for
up to six hours a day for one year and will provide technical advice
and guidance. India will be responsible for developing the instructional
television programs; transmitting the programs from an earth station
to the satellite; and providing approximately 5,000 village television
sets. Some 2,000 of the television sets will be designed to receive signals
directly from the spacecraft, and the remainder of the sets will receive
the signals via ground relay stations. India will also be responsible for
obtaining necessary international frequency clearances and evaluating
the results of the experiment which then will be made available to all
nations. India will assume all costs associated with the ground segment
programming, training and analysis. The tangible cost to the United
States in permitting India to use the satellite is minimal. This program




Should the Indian experience prove to be a success both technically
and economically, future requests for broadcast satellites could raise seri-
ous political questions. For example, the word "education" can have
varying meanings depending upon the political orientation in any given
State. In other words, where does education end and propaganda begin?
Moreover, in the extreme, the broadcast satellite lends itself to thought
control. Similarly, the success of the broadcast satellite experiment could
raise major economic questions in highly developed industrial States. In
the event of such success, existing methods of television and radio broad-
casting could suffer severe economic disruption. The problem of regu-
latory procedures would unquestionably be raised. Consequently, the
day is not far off when the nations involved must give careful study to
the political and economic impact of broadcast satellites.
B. Earth Resources Satellite
One of the important new space developments of considerable eco-
nomic potential is the Earth Resources Satellite program (ERTS). Re-
sults obtained from multispectral photographs and sensor data in early
manned Apollo flights and specially fitted aircraft demonstrated that it
is possible to photograph the earth's surface on a repetitive basis from an
orbiting satellite and thereby acquire significant environmental informa-
tion that may be employed in a number of disciplines. For example, ERTS
data may prove to be valuable in the monitoring and management of
agricultural crops, including the identification and control of diseased
crops; in the surveillance and management of water resources; in pro-
grams of pollution control; in identification of new fishing grounds; and
in the location of oil and other mineral deposits. Although these and
other potential benefits from space photography have not yet been fully
assessed, the developmental work already accomplished indicates that the
initial demonstration satellites to be orbited in 1972 and 1973 will con-
firm the expectations of the ERTS program.
Should the ERTS program prove technologically successful, there
may be a number of legal, political and economic problems which will
need resolution. The ability to obtain important economic information
from ERTS satellites may raise a question of the proprietary rights among
individual countries. Some progress in this area has already been made.
In 1968, NASA entered into agreements with Brazil and Mexico for in-
strumented aircraft flights over those countries to test the Earth Re-
1971]
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sources sensing equipment. These programs have proved successful in
demonstrating the economic value of the ERTS program while alleviat-
ing possible fears that the satellite would be used as a "spy in the sky."
Another matter of possible concern, should the ERTS program prove
successful, is the manner in which accumulated information would be
made available. Should information of economic importance be made
available at all? (ERTS is capable of discovering new mineral deposits.)
What safeguards are needed to prevent one enterprise from gaining un-
fair advantage as a result of deliberate or inadvertent disclosure of in-
formation? (This suggests a method similar to that used by the Depart-
ment of Agriculture to provide information to the public on crop pro-
duction.) Should a national monopoly be permitted on information of
international concern? (The identification of new fishing grounds has
economic implications for more than one country.)
While these policy questions do not require immediate solution, early
consideration and discussion would nevertheless assure more complete
understanding of the problem areas and the alternative solutions avail-
able.
C. Space Shuttle-Space Station
Looking to the next decade of space activity when exploitation must
follow exploration, NASA is actively studying a reusable space vehicle-
the Space Shuttle-which can economically transport men, payloads and
supplies to and from orbit. This, in turn, would permit development of
a large space station in earth orbit in which men would live and work in
space. The space station conceivably could continue in a usable state in
orbit for periods as long as ten years, being resupplied and restaffed by
the space shuttle.
The development of the space shuttle represents a technical and man-
agerial challenge more difficult than anything attempted heretofore in
space technology. The fundamental characteristics of the space shuttle
are an operational mode approaching an airliner-type operation for pas-
sengers and payload at significant reductions in cost and a capability of
supporting a variety of missions, while providing a less severe payload
environment. Current cost estimates for the development of a space
shuttle and space station approximate ten billion dollars.
On March 7, 1970, President Nixon in a statement on the future of
the space program remarked: "I believe that both the adventures and
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the applications of space missions should be shared by all peoples. Our
progress will be faster and other accomplishments will be greater if na-
tions will join together in this effort, both in contributing the resources
and in enjoying the benefits."
In furtherance of this presidential declaration, NASA in early 1970
took steps to encourage free world participation in the planning and de-
velopment phase of post-Apollo transportation systems such as the space
shuttle. The NASA administration made trips to Europe, Canada, Aus-
tralia and Japan to inform the nations which are most active in space of
the United States' plans for the next decade. Subsequently, international
conferences were held in Washington, Paris and Bonn during which
NASA officials reviewed and discussed more specifically its plans for
post-Apollo programs.
Considerable interest in a cooperative venture on the development of
the space shuttle was expressed by the Western European countries. As a
consequence more detailed discussions were held between United States
officials and European space organizations' representatives in 1970 and
early 1971 to consider possible arrangements for cooperation.
The principal policy questions generated by these discussions with
Western Europe are:
(1) What role will Europe play in the development of post-Apollo
hardware? The United States has advanced the concept that the Euro-
pean nations have the option of deciding which developmental tasks they
wish to undertake. There would be two provisos: (a) establishment of
technical competence to do the job; (b) absorbtion of the developmen-
tal costs of the task selected. The United States would have overall man-
agement and decision authority with the exception of tasks undertaken
by European nations. In the latter instance, decisions would be made
jointly.
(2) How much detailed technology should be shared with Western
Europe? The United States suggests that Western Europe be entitled to
complete access to general, publishable information. Detailed access in-
volving production know-how would be available to the Western Euro-
peans on those tasks which they finance.
(3) What choices must the Europeans make if they are to partici-
pate in the space shuttle program? The Western European nations main-
tain that they cannot provide substantial funds for both their own pro-
grams and participation with the United States. If they choose partici-
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pation with the United States they must correspondingly reduce their
own programs. This would curtail the availability of launch vehicles and
services for European missions. Accordingly, as a quid pro quo, they
request the United States to provide launch vehicles and services for
European missions during the seven or eight year period required to
bring the space shuttle to fruition. The United States, recognizing the
problem, has offered to provide launch vehicles and services at reim-
bursable cost, provided that the European nations participate substan-
tially; in other words, to an extent of approximately one billion dollars
or ten percent of the total cost. Moreover, the United States would re-
quire that the European missions be for peaceful purposes and consistent
with outstanding treaties and international organizations such as Intelsat.
IV. CONCLUSION
In a little more than a decade, the United States has established a pro-
gram of space exploration unequaled in its success by any other nation.
Manned exploration of the moon, as a symbol of America's advanced
space technology, has come to appear almost routine. Although a com-
prehensive assessment of the benefits from space exploration lies in the
future, nevertheless, current scientific yields for the program are stagger-
ing in nature.
Having achieved our national goal of being first to the moon, the ques-
tion of budgetary priority is being raised. The psychological blow de-
livered by Sputnik in 1957 should serve as a reminder that a lack of vigi-
lance might create a future technological Pearl Harbor. Clearly, the
United States requires a substantial space program to garner the benefits
arising from aerospace activities.
